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Libya 2011 : How US & NATO Mass bombings led to slavery
African studies

Libya 2011 : How US & NATO Mass bombings led to slavery

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Libya 2011: How US & NATO Mass Bombings Led to Slavery

Introduction

In August 2017, a CNN crew filmed a night-time auction outside Tripoli. A man addressed an unseen crowd and offered “big strong boys for farm work.” The bidding ran from four hundred to eight hundred, and the men on offer were sold for 1,200 Libyan dinars each, about $400 at the time. They were migrants from West Africa who had come to Libya hoping to reach Europe. They were sold as property.

Six years earlier, American, British and French jets had been bombing Libya under a United Nations mandate to protect civilians. The state they helped destroy had a coast guard, a police force, a prison system, a border and a government that could be held to account. The state that replaced it had two rival governments, hundreds of militias and a trade in human beings.

This book asks how one led to the other. It does not claim that bombs alone made slavery, and it does not pretend that Libya was a paradise before 2011. It traces a chain: a bombing campaign that turned from civilian protection into regime change, a leader killed in the street, a state with nothing to replace it, armed groups that filled the gap, and a trade in migrants that grew in the space they controlled. Each link is documented, and the people who made the decisions have said, in their own words, that the aftermath went wrong.

Why this matters now

The same questions are being asked about Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Iran. Libya is the clearest recent case of a war that was sold as humanitarian and ended with a humanitarian disaster of its own. It is also a case where the leaders involved have admitted failure. If their admissions are not enough to change how wars are started, the record has to be set out for everyone who will be asked to support the next one, and for the people who live where the next one will land.

How to read this book

Every claim is sourced in chapter 15. Where figures are disputed, the range is given. Where the evidence is thin, the book says so. Where the book argues a point, it says it is arguing.

Libya before the bombs

Muammar Gaddafi ruled Libya for more than forty years after taking power in 1969. His government was repressive, ran no free elections and abused its opponents. It was also a state, with a national army, police, a border and a single authority that decided who held guns. That fact matters for everything that follows.

In December 2003 Libya announced that it was dismantling its weapons of mass destruction programs and allowing inspections, in return for ending its isolation. Western leaders held the deal up as a model. The Wilson Center’s account of the decision notes that Libyan officials estimated the nuclear program was about five years from the weapons threshold when it was abandoned, so the country did not have a bomb when it gave the program up. Chapter 14 returns to this.

In February 2011, protests against Gaddafi spread across the country and the government responded with force. The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1970, which imposed sanctions and an arms embargo, and then resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011.

The decision: who authorized it, who led it

Resolution 1973 was proposed by France, Lebanon and the United Kingdom. It passed with ten votes in favor, none against and five abstentions: Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia. It authorized member states to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians and established a no-fly zone. The Arab League had asked the Security Council to act. The abstaining countries warned that force could have unintended consequences and called for a political solution.

The people in charge:

United States: President Barack Obama, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as a leading voice for intervention.

United Kingdom: Prime Minister David Cameron, who with France led the push for action.

France: President Nicolas Sarkozy, whom a later UK parliamentary report described as having driven the enthusiasm to intervene. The committee chairman said Britain was “dragged along by a French enthusiasm.”

NATO: took over command of the air campaign at the end of March 2011.

The campaign: from protecting civilians to regime change

The mandate was to protect civilians. The campaign became something larger. In September 2016 the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, after a full inquiry, concluded that the limited intervention to protect civilians had “drifted into an opportunist policy of regime change” with no strategy for what would follow. It found that the intelligence was inaccurate, that the threat to civilians had been overstated, and that British policy “selectively took elements of Gaddafi’s rhetoric at face value.” It reported that Gaddafi had no record of large-scale attacks on civilians, despite his abuses over forty years, and that political options, including through Tony Blair’s contacts with Gaddafi, were available once Benghazi was secure and were not pursued.

The committee held Cameron “ultimately responsible” for the failure to develop a coherent strategy, and said Cameron and Sarkozy bore responsibility for the failure of the campaign and the rise of ISIS in Libya. Cameron declined to give evidence to the inquiry. The UK Foreign Office replied that Gaddafi was unpredictable and had the means to carry out his threats, and that the decision to intervene was international, called for by the Arab League and authorized by the UN.

On civilian deaths from NATO’s own strikes, the numbers are small beside Iraq’s, and this book reports them as they are. A UN commission of inquiry documented about 60 civilian deaths. Airwars estimated between roughly 220 and 400. Forces loyal to Gaddafi killed many more, by Airwars’ reckoning between about 870 and 2,000. The case of this book is not that NATO’s bombs killed the most people in 2011. It is what the bombs removed, and what grew in the space.

The killing of Gaddafi and the day after

Gaddafi was captured by forces of the National Transitional Council in Sirte on 20 October 2011, and killed shortly afterward. Secretary of State Clinton was asked about it in a CBS interview that day and said, laughing, “We came, we saw, he died.” The remark was recorded on video and has followed her since.

There was no plan for the day after. That is not the book’s phrase. It is what the US president said.

How the power structure collapsed

The Libyan state under Gaddafi was built around him. The army, the police and the security services were loyal to him personally, and the formal institutions were thin. When he fell, there was no replacement ready, and no foreign force on the ground to hold the space.

The UK parliamentary report found that the government identified the need to secure the large stockpiles of weapons after Gaddafi’s overthrow, but that it was probable none of the countries involved was prepared to commit the necessary resources. The weapons were left, and spread. Analysts documented flows of arms from Libya to Egypt, Gaza, Niger, Somalia and Syria, and to fighters in Mali, where rebels seized the north in 2012 with weapons from Libya.

The new government depended on the same revolutionary militias that had fought Gaddafi to provide security, because it had no force of its own. A government that relies on armed groups it cannot control is not governing them.

The militias rise

In 2014 the transitional authority split into two rival governments, one in Tripoli and one in Tobruk, each backed by its own armed factions and by different foreign states. In May 2014 General Khalifa Haftar, a Gaddafi-era officer who had spent years in the United States, launched an offensive in Benghazi, and fighting broke out in Tripoli. Clashes between rival militias that summer cost hundreds of lives and displaced over 250,000 Libyans. By mid-2014 the conflict had become a proxy war, with outside powers on both sides. Researchers counted at least 10,700 deaths in the civil war by 2019.

The UN fact-finding mission on Libya concluded in 2023 that the violations it investigated were “connected primarily to the consolidation of power and wealth by militias and other state-affiliated groups.” This is the central link in the book’s argument. The groups that profited from slavery did not appear from nowhere. They rose in a country where no one had a monopoly on force.

The slave markets

Migrants have always crossed Libya, which sits between sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean. After 2011 the route became a business. In April 2017 the International Organization for Migration said it had evidence of “slave market conditions,” with destitute migrants sold in auctions. In November 2017 CNN broadcast the footage of an auction outside Tripoli, after verifying it and visiting the sites. CNN reported nine locations across Libya where auctions had reportedly been held, and said there were likely more. One survivor said the police had sold him for 500 dinars to a man who made him work in a tomato field.

The UN fact-finding mission’s final report, in March 2023, found reasonable grounds to believe that migrants were enslaved in official detention centers and secret prisons, that sexual slavery was committed against migrants (a crime against humanity), and that torture of migrants was systematic. It found that trafficking, enslavement, forced labor, extortion and smuggling generated significant revenue for individuals, groups and state institutions, and “incentivized the continuation of violations.” More than 670,000 migrants from over 41 countries were in Libya during that period. The mission said that European support for the Libyan coast guard and detention system amounted to aiding abuses, and recommended that all support to actors implicated in crimes against humanity end.

What the leaders said afterward

Obama. On Fox News Sunday in April 2016, asked for the worst mistake of his presidency, he said: “Probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya.” He told The Atlantic the same month that the Libya intervention “didn’t work,” and criticized Britain and France for failing to follow through, calling European allies “free-riders” unwilling to put skin in the game. The White House later said the US and its allies had not mobilized the resources the aftermath required.

Look at what the statement does and does not say. It admits a failure of planning. It does not admit that the bombing was wrong, and it describes the intervention as “the right thing to do.” It also came eighteen months before CNN’s footage, so the president was not responding to the slave markets. The book’s argument is that a catastrophe on this scale cannot be reduced to a planning error, and that a leader who calls the war right and the aftermath a lapse has described a mistake in management. The people in Libya’s detention centers experienced something else.

Cameron. He defended the intervention as necessary to stop Gaddafi, who he said was bearing down on Benghazi and threatening to shoot his own people like rats. His own parliament’s committee later said the threat to civilians had been overstated.

Clinton. Her remark on Gaddafi’s death is quoted above. In 2016 she was still being questioned about her role, and Obama’s statement drew attention to her part as the secretary of state who oversaw American planning for the aftermath.

Sarkozy. France’s president drove the push for intervention. He was voted out of office the next year.

The mechanics: how a bombing became a slave trade

The chain, stated plainly:

A mandate to protect civilians is passed (March 2011).

The campaign expands to removing the government (summer 2011).

The leader is killed (October 2011), and no government exists to replace him.

Weapons are not secured, and stockpiles spread across the region.

The new authorities depend on militias, because they have no army.

The state splits in two (2014), and militias fight for territory, oil and money, with foreign backers on each side.

A market in migrants grows where no authority controls the territory: detention for ransom, forced labor, sale.

Outside governments pay for the system’s edges, funding a coast guard and detention network that the UN says commits crimes against humanity.

No one in that chain decided to create slavery. That is the point. The decisions were made for other reasons, by people who did not stay to see where they led.

The strongest objections

“Libya had slavery and abuse of migrants before 2011.” Abuse of Black African migrants in Libya did not begin in 2011, and human rights groups documented it under Gaddafi too. The book’s claim is narrower: the post-2011 collapse removed the one authority that could be held to account, and the abuse became an open market run by competing armed groups.

“Libyans made these choices, not NATO.” True, and Libyans are the ones who suffered most. But the intervention was a decision by outside powers to remove a government, and the people who made it say they had no plan for what followed. Shared responsibility is still responsibility.

“Gaddafi was a dictator who would have killed thousands.” He was a dictator. The UK committee found that the evidence showed he had no record of large-scale attacks on civilians, and that the threat in Benghazi was overstated. The question is not whether he was cruel. It is whether the alternative the intervention produced was better.

“The UN authorized it.” It did, by ten votes to none with five abstentions, for the purpose of protecting civilians. Whether the campaign stayed within that purpose is exactly what the UK inquiry questioned.

“Syria shows what happens when you don’t intervene.” Lord Richards, who led the British armed forces in 2011, made that argument against the committee’s findings. It is a serious point. It shows that both choices carry a cost, and it is why this book asks what can be done differently, not only what went wrong.

What can be learned

Removing a state is not the same as protecting civilians. The two goals can pull against each other, and the mandate to protect people was used to do something else.

Plan for the day after, or do not begin. Obama said it himself: it is a lesson he now applies when asked to intervene.

Secure the weapons. Unsecured stockpiles became other countries’ wars.

A state with no monopoly on force becomes a market. Armed groups sell what they control, and in Libya that included people.

Aftermath is part of the war. A campaign judged only by its air phase has not been judged.

Accountability goes both ways. The UK committee blamed its own prime minister, and no one in Libya has been held responsible for the slave markets.

What can be done: stopping the next Libya

Condition every intervention on a funded plan for the aftermath, and make leaders state in advance who will provide security, who will hold weapons, and for how long.

Exhaust political options first, as the UK committee found had not been done in Libya.

Keep to the mandate. If the resolution says protect civilians, the campaign should be bound by it, and a change of goal should go back to the Security Council.

End European funding for Libyan abuse. The UN mission recommended that all support to actors implicated in crimes against humanity stop.

Support prosecution. The mission said it would pass evidence to the International Criminal Court.

Give migrants a legal way out. The market exists because people are stuck in Libya and need to be smuggled out.

Support African institutions with a real role in conflicts on their own continent. The African Union and the Arab League were consulted in 2011 and could not shape the outcome.

The nuclear question: a companion book

Libya’s story is one reason I wrote a second book, Would African Nuclear Bombs Prevent Invasion, Genocide & Slavery?, which takes a harder question: would a state with a nuclear deterrent have been left alone?

The case for yes starts with Libya. Gaddafi gave up his weapons programs in 2003 in exchange for normal relations, and was overthrown with Western air support eight years later. North Korea has pointed to Libya as a lesson, saying that giving up its weapons would invite the same fate. The case for no is just as real. Libya did not have a bomb to give up, and its program was years from the threshold. Analysts also point out that North Korea’s position is very different, and that a nuclear-armed Africa would carry risks of its own, including accidents, theft and arms races. That book examines both sides and asks whether deterrence could ever protect the continent from invasion, genocide and slavery, or only add a new danger.

You can read it at realienlabs.com/ebooks/would-african-nuclear-bombs-prevent-invasion-genocide-and-slavery.

Sources and notes

The decision and the vote

[1] UN Security Council, Resolution 1973 (17 March 2011), press release SC/10200 (10 in favor, 5 abstentions: Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia); Australian Parliamentary Library FlagPost (24 March 2011); New Statesman (21 March 2011) on the abstainers’ reasoning.

UK inquiry and the leaders

[2] UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK’s future policy options (14 September 2016), as reported by the BBC, Anadolu, Reuters/Gulf News, The Week, the Scotsman and the New York Times (via Equipo Nizkor).

[3] Obama: Fox News Sunday (10 April 2016) as reported by CNBC, Democracy Now, AFP/Ahram, Reason and Military Times; The Atlantic (March 2016); White House comment as reported by Military Times (11 April 2016).

[4] Clinton: CBS News interview (20 October 2011), as reported by The Wrap and TRANSCEND/CBS.

[5] Gaddafi’s death: PBS NewsHour (20 October 2011).

Collapse, militias, arms

[6] United States Institute of Peace; Carnegie Middle East Center, Ending Libya’s Civil War (2014); Middle East Research and Information Project (2019); The Nation (June 2014); Washington Institute; Al Jazeera, “Libya Today” (2017); GlobalSecurity.org. Deaths and displacement figures are from MERIP and GlobalSecurity.

NATO strike casualties

[7] UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya; Airwars.

Slavery and migrant abuse

[8] CNN, “People for Sale” (14 and 15 November 2017); Dawn/AFP (23 November 2017); IOM statement (April 2017); Global Citizen; Fortune (29 November 2017).

[9] UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, final report (A/HRC/52/83, 27 March 2023); UN News, Reuters, the Associated Press, Anadolu and Dawn coverage of the report.

[10] Abuse of migrants under the Gaddafi government: Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports (2006 and 2010), which should be consulted for details.

Nuclear disarmament

[11] Stimson Center, “Lessons from Libya’s Nuclear Disarmament 20 Years On”; Wilson Center, “Giving Up on the Bomb”; 38 North (March 2011); Columbia Journal of International Affairs; Reuters/TRANSCEND (2013) on North Korea’s statements.

Note on figures. Casualty and migrant counts vary by organization and method. Where a range is given, both ends come from named sources. The CNN auction price is stated as CNN broadcast it: 1,200 dinars, about $400, with some outlets citing $800.